Modelling cyber risk: FAIR’s fair?
Proponents say factor analysis can be applied to cyber risk; detractors retort results are still guesswork
Of all the potential loss events banks’ operational risk managers are tasked with trying to model, cyber attacks are among the most challenging.
Firstly, say op risk managers, there’s the sheer range of cyber threats banks are exposed to, and the wide variability in the frequency with which they occur. Distributed denial-of-service attacks, viruses and email phishing threats are everyday occurrences for a bank; successful ransomware attacks and data breaches that result in large data thefts are – for now – relatively uncommon.
Modelling the frequency of any potential op risk loss event is difficult; but practitioners argue this is especially true for cyber, for three reasons.
“Firstly, I think there is a non-linear relationship between controls and losses, as the controls are only as good as the weakest link,” says one senior op risk manager, citing the examples of staff turning off anti-virus software to download an attachment, or responding to a convincing-looking phishing email.
The relationship could hold the other way, too; a large, sophisticated bank could have inadequate cyber defences – but provided it is perceived to be strong, there is evidence to suggest it is less likely to be a target for cyber attack. The op risk manager cites recent payment network frauds being concentrated on emerging market banks as an example.
Finally, a bank cannot model its exposure to a so-called zero day attack – one that exploits an unknown vulnerability in its cyber safeguards, for which by definition it has no defence.
The loss impact of any of these events is also highly variable. For example, regulatory fines for poor systems and controls processes in the event of a data breach will be set at the discretion of supervisors; banks subject to the European Union’s forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation could be whacked with fines of up to 4% of their annual turnover in the event of a serious breach, or 2% if they simply fail to notify their regulator within 72 hours.
Other losses – ransom payments to cyber thieves, compensation to affected customers, loss of future business due to reputational damage – are also difficult if not impossible to quantify with any accuracy. Small wonder, then, that Rohan Amin, chief information security officer at JP Morgan, describes trying to model the loss a bank can expect from a particular cyber event as “at best, a guess”.
More than a decade after it was first applied to modelling cyber risk, the most commonly used approach to quantifying cyber threats among banks remains the Factor Analysis of Information Risk (Fair) model. The approach provides a straightforward map of risk factors and their interrelationships, with its outputs then used to inform a quantitative analysis, such as Monte Carlo simulations or a sensitivities-based analysis.
Many underwriters are not doing any underwriting at all. They’re simply saying, ‘this is my price for the [policy] limit’. It’s rather scary
John Elbl, Air
Proponents say the approach helps banks order and prioritise their defences against the myriad threats they face; detractors say its outputs are only as reliable as the inputs, which, due to the nature of the threats in the case of cyber risk, are inherently based on guesswork.
Shorn of a way of predicting losses accurately, banks may look to the traditional risk-transfer medium of insurance – though underwriters have long struggled to model the potential impact of cyber threats too. Modelling techniques have evolved rapidly in the past couple of years, firms say; it is now common for underwriters to tap the services of catastrophe modelling firms – companies more used to assessing potential losses from natural disasters – as well as niche cyber security firms, who can use a range of covert techniques such as ethical hacking to assess a potential clients’ defences.
However, amid swelling demand from banks for cyber cover, some fear underwriting standards have gone backwards: “Many underwriters are not doing any underwriting at all. They’re simply saying, ‘this is my price for the [policy] limit’. It’s rather scary,” John Elbl, cyber risk expert at Air, a catastrophe modelling firm, tells tells Risk.net.
Banks are all too cognizant that insurance can only ever be a loss mitigant, and not a defence against a potentially existential threat. As Gilles Mawas, senior expert in cyber, IT and third-party risk at BNP Paribas, recently put it: “Being reimbursed after you’re dead is irrelevant. If you lose €3 billion–5 billion ($3.4 billion–5.6 billion) and two years later you get back 50%, what’s the point?”
Further reading
コンテンツを印刷またはコピーできるのは、有料の購読契約を結んでいるユーザー、または法人購読契約の一員であるユーザーのみです。
これらのオプションやその他の購読特典を利用するには、info@risk.net にお問い合わせいただくか、こちらの購読オプションをご覧ください: http://subscriptions.risk.net/subscribe
現在、このコンテンツを印刷することはできません。詳しくはinfo@risk.netまでお問い合わせください。
現在、このコンテンツをコピーすることはできません。詳しくはinfo@risk.netまでお問い合わせください。
Copyright インフォプロ・デジタル・リミテッド.無断複写・転載を禁じます。
当社の利用規約、https://www.infopro-digital.com/terms-and-conditions/subscriptions/(ポイント2.4)に記載されているように、印刷は1部のみです。
追加の権利を購入したい場合は、info@risk.netまで電子メールでご連絡ください。
Copyright インフォプロ・デジタル・リミテッド.無断複写・転載を禁じます。
このコンテンツは、当社の記事ツールを使用して共有することができます。当社の利用規約、https://www.infopro-digital.com/terms-and-conditions/subscriptions/(第2.4項)に概説されているように、認定ユーザーは、個人的な使用のために資料のコピーを1部のみ作成することができます。また、2.5項の制限にも従わなければなりません。
追加権利の購入をご希望の場合は、info@risk.netまで電子メールでご連絡ください。
詳細はこちら 我々の見解
銀行システムを「換気」する時期が来たのか?
監視団体は基準の引き下げを懸念していますが、政策立案者は成長に注目しており、彼らは難しいジレンマに直面しています。
なぜ破綻処理計画を骨抜きにするのは良くないのか
銀行の破綻は避けられないものですが、銀行危機はそうではありません
日本の「大還流」?急速なリパトリは期待できない
GPIFによる米国債から日本国債への切り替えは段階的に行われる見通しであり、これはヘッジファンドにとってさらなる悪材料となる可能性があります
AIエージェントが、信頼できないスタッフのような存在である理由
GenAIシステムに内在する不確実性により、リスク管理担当者はより対立的なアプローチをとらざるを得ません
批判派は、パーペチュアルはすべてフロスだと言っています。しかし、数字はそうではないことを示唆している
TradFiを原資産とする永久先物に対する堅調な未決済建玉は、CMEやEurexといった既存の取引所にとって脅威となる可能性があります
SpaceXがCMEの個別銘柄先物に待望の追い風をもたらした
S&P 500先物契約へのIPO関連の追加契約として、新たな契約が急増する可能性があります
Bank vs non-bank: FX’s two-tier reality
CME and LSEG data show banks provide sticky and broad liquidity, while non-banks cling tightly to the price
規制当局はエンフォースメントを甘くしているのか?(そして、私たちはそれを気にするべきなのか?)
米国の規制当局は、技術的な規則違反に対する罰則を緩和しており、小さくとも重要なリスクが見過ごされてしまうのではないかという懸念が高まっています