Fernando Cerezetti
Bank of England
Fernando Cerezetti is a Director of Risk Oversight at ICE Clear Europe, part of Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). He currently chairs the Risk Committee of the European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH). He holds a PhD in Statistics from University of São Paulo, with focus on Bayesian Statistics. Prior to joining ICE in 2018, he worked as Risk Advisor for the Risk, Research and CCP Policy division of the Bank of England. His research interests include risk management, financial market infrastructures, financial stability, and statistical hypothesis testing.
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Articles by Fernando Cerezetti
Climate risk and central counterparty risk management
In this paper, the European Association of CCP Clearing Houses discusses several aspects of climate risk, including how climate risk is currently integrated into central counterparty stress testing, the metrics within climate risk and how central…
Supervisory stress testing for central counterparties: a macroprudential, two-tier approach
This paper examines the role of supervisory stress testing of central counterparties (CCPs). A key message is that the design of supervisory stress tests (SSTs) should be tailored to CCPs’ roles, risk profiles and financial structures.
Central counterparty anti-procyclicality tools: a closer assessment
This paper investigates whether the substantial focus placed on the procyclicality of initial margin reflects both the original concerns at the time of the 2007-8 financial crisis and the intrinsic 'modus operandi' of CCPs.
Who pays? Who gains? Central counterparty resource provision in the post-Pittsburgh world
In this paper, the authors develop a conceptual framework to examine whether the regulatory changes since the Pittsburgh Summit could be a catalyst for reconsidering the structure of clearing houses.
Estimating “hedge and auction” liquidation costs in central counterparties: a closeout risk approach
This paper shows how the closeout risk framework can be extended to realistically represent and simulate the potential outcomes of “hedge and auction” default management policies currently implemented by several major central counterparties.