Systemic Risks in Central Counterparty Clearing House Networks

Alexander Lipton

16.1 INTRODUCTION

The global financial crisis of 2007–10 had enormous implications for the financial ecosystem as a whole. Among many other changes to its way of working, both the range of products and the number of trades cleared by central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs) increased enormously (see, for example, US Office of Financial Research 2017). As a result, whether they like it or not, all large banks are engaged in trading on CCPs. Accordingly, there is a clear need for banks to assess any potential losses due to defaults of general clearing members (GCMs) and CCPs through the CCP network they participate in. The interconnectedness of the CCPs themselves, arising due to the fact that they are linked through common clearing members, means that it is important to model most of the network.

In this chapter, we take the perspective of a hypothetical banking group, “XYZ Bank”, and explain how it may assess its risks based on the partial information available to it. Typically, a banking group has multiple subsidiaries, each of which are distinct clearing members.

Figure 16.1

Understanding the risk of XYZ Bank is a challenging task, which requires analysing the contingent

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