In light of institutional knowledge, this paper presents the similarities between the survivor-pay component (Tranche 2) of the Canadian large-value transfer system (LVTS) and credit default swap (CDS) contracts. Accordingly, the default leg of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) or central counterparties (CCPs) is similar to that of a CDS, whereas liquidity efficiencies are mapped to the premium leg. Consequently, this paper conducts a simple numerical approximation of the empirical risk-neutral daily valuation of Tranche 2 from January 2005 to December 2016. In so doing, it identifies conditions under which LVTS participants might withdraw from the loss-sharing framework. The results highlight a potential specification of risk-based access to clearing and settlement in FMIs. A further policy implication of valuations of the credit risk–liquidity risk trade-off is the dampening of perceptions of procyclicality in loss-sharing arrangements.