Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures

Central counterparties and systemic stability

Marc Bayle de Jessé

  • Central counterparties (CCPs) are systemically relevant market infrastructures with the potential, in adverse market conditions, to channel and amplify stress across the financial sector.
  • In the interest of their core monetary policy functions, central banks of issue (CBIs) need to be able – in cooperation with the respective home country authorities – to monitor systemic risk and liquidity needs stemming from CCPs and, where necessary, to influence the risk management of CCPs that are systemically important for their currency, even if these CCPs are located outside their currency area.
  • The future CCP landscape in Europe will be shaped two key questions: how to strike the optimal balance between competition and concentration and how technological innovations such as distributed ledger technology (DLT) will affect the economics of central clearing.

This issue collects selected papers from the Financial Market Infrastructure Confer- ence II: New Thinking in a New Era, hosted and organized by De Nederlandsche Bank with support from the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Mexico, the Law Department of the London School of Economics (LSE Law) and The Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures. The following is the text of a keynote address by Marc Bayle de Jessé presented at the conference.

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