SG admitted that it did not monitor transactions that were subsequently cancelled or modified, nor nominal positions (as opposed to net positions), nor transactions with unspecified counterparties or unusual dates.
Its staff were too ready to accept Kerviel's explanations when internal monitors raised the alarms - which happened a total of 93 times, the report said.
Though five other banks - not named in the report - were involved in Kerviel's deals as counterparties, most of the deals relied on using internal counterparties, which did not trigger alarms based on the size of the counterparty risk. The eight forward deals that finally raised suspicion were with a small bank in early January this year.
The report also highlighted the extent of Kerviel's deception - while he continued to report only a minimal profit or loss, his actual profit and loss in 2007 dipped to a loss of more than €2.5 billion before rising to around €1.5 billion profit at the end of the year.
The week on Risk.net,October 14-20, 2016Receive this by email